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Abstract
This article assesses the unilateral effects on prices of a merger in the Portuguese mobile
telephony market. We use aggregate quarterly data from 1999 to 2005 and a nested logit
model to estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of subscription of
mobile telephony. Given these estimates, we simulate the effects of the merger. We find that
the available mobile telephony subscription products are close substitutes. The merger may
cause substantial price increases, even in the presence of large cost efficiencies. On average,
prices increase by 7% without cost efficiencies, and by about 6% with a 10% marginal cost
reduction.
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1 Introduction
In February 2006, the firm Sonaecom proposed an operation that would involve, among other
things, the merger of the Portuguese mobile telephony firms Tmn and Optimus. The Portuguese
market includes a third firm, Vodafone. The revenue market shares of Tmn, Vodafone, and
Optimus are, respectively: 50%, 37%, and 13%. Given that the merger reduces the number of
competitors from three to two, and increases considerably the level of concentration, it raises
serious anti-competitive concerns.
According to the EC Merger Regulation,1 mergers must be assessed to determine whether
they significantly lessen competition, due to the creation or reinforcement of a dominant position.
In economic terms, mergers must be assessed to determine whether they enhance the market
power of the firms in the market. Horizontal mergers may significantly lessen competition
through: (i) unilateral effects, i.e., by eliminating important competitive constraints, or, (ii)
coordinated effects, i.e., by making anti-competitive coordination between the remaining firms
more likely or more effective. This article assesses the unilateral effects on prices of the merger
between Tmn and Optimus.
Our analysis uses aggregate quarterly data from 1999 to 2005. We estimate an aggregate
nested logit model, based on a linear utility function for mobile telephony subscription, developed
by Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2006).2 Given the estimates of the price elasticities of demand,
and assuming that firms play a Bertrand game, we estimate the marginal costs. We use the
estimates of the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs to simulate the unilateral
effects on prices of the merger. Our results indicate that the merger would lead to significant
price increases, even in the presence of substantial cost efficiencies. On average, prices increase by
7% without cost efficiencies, and by 6% with a 10% a marginal cost reduction. The price of some
products could increase by as much as 13%. On average, without marginal cost efficiencies, the
1Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 (OJ L 24, 29.01.2004, p.1).
2According to Crooke et al (1999), predicted post-merger price changes vary greatly with the demand spec-
ification. The price increases predicted by the logit model are lower than those predicted by the log-linear and
AIDS models, but higher than those predicted by the linear demand.
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consumer surplus and the social welfare decrease both by 3%. We find no evidence of collusion
in prices.
There is a growing, but still scarce, econometric literature on merger analysis. Nevo (2000)
estimated a random coefficient model to study the effects of mergers in the US ready-to-eat
cereal industry. Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) analyzed the effects of the merger between Volvo
and Scania in the EU. Pinkse and Slade (2004) used a distance metric approach to study mergers
in the brewing industry. Pereira and Ribeiro (2006) analyzed the effects on broadband access to
the Internet of the divestiture, the opposite of a merger, of the Portuguese telecommunications
incumbent from the cable television industry.
Regarding the empirical literature on mobile telephony, Rodini et al. (2002) estimated the
substitutability of fixed and mobile services for telecommunications access, using data on US
households. Okada and Hatta (1999) analyzed jointly the demand for mobile and fixed telephony
services using Japanese data. Barros and Cadima (2000) estimated simultaneously diffusion
curves for mobile and fixed telephony in Portugal. Grzybowski and Doganoglu (2006) used a
nested logit model to estimate the demand for subscription of mobile telephony in Germany.
Gagnepain and Pereira (forthcoming) analyzed the impact of the entry of a third firm on the
Portuguese mobile telephony market, and showed that it caused the other firms to increase their
cost reducing efforts.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
Portuguese mobile telephony industry. Section 3 presents the econometric model and the data.
Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 conducts the analysis of the impact of the
merger. Section 6 concludes.
2 Mobile Telephony in Portugal
In Portugal, the firm associated with the telecommunications incumbent, Tmn, started
operations in 1989 with the analogue technology C-450. In 1991, the sectorial regulator, ICP-
ANACOM, assigned two licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 900. One of the licenses
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was assigned to Tmn. The other license was assigned to the entrant Vodafone. In 1997, the
sectorial regulator assigned three licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 1800. Two
licenses were assigned to Tmn and Vodafone. A third license was assigned to the entrant
Optimus, which was also granted a license to operate GSM 900. In 2001, the sectorial regulator
assigned licences to operate the 3G technology IMT2000 /UMTS. Three licenses were assigned
to Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus. A fourth license was assigned to the entrant Oniway, which
was not granted a license to operate GSM, and never operated before. Service began in 2001.
After its inception in 1989, the Portuguese mobile telephony industry had a fast diffusion,
analyzed in Pereira and Pernias (2006) and Pereira et al. (2006). In 2005, the penetration rate
of mobile telephony in Portugal was 108%.3
After entering the market in 1992, Vodafone gained revenue market share rapidly. During
the duopoly period, i.e., from 1992 to 1997, Tmn and Vodafone shared the market. The entry
of Optimus led to an asymmetric split of the market, which suggests that this event had a
substantial impact in the industry, analyzed in Gagnepain and Pereira (2006).
In February 2006, the holding company Sonaecom, that owns Optimus, made an hostile take
bid for the holding company Portugal Telecom, PT, the telecommunications incumbent. The
merger of Tmn and Optimus was one of the conditions for the operation to go through.
3 Econometric Model
3.1 Demand
We assume that all consumers have access to a fixed telephone. Consumers face a two stage
decision. In the first stage, they decide whether to continue to use only fixed telephony, or to
use also mobile telephony. In the second stage, they decide to which mobile telephony product
they subscribe, if they decided to use mobile telephony in the first stage. This is a standard
3The penetration rate is the numbers of subscribers per 100 inhabitants.
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nested logit structure, where one branch is degenerated and involves no further choices.4 We
index the nests with subscript g = 0, 1, where the nest g = 0 represents the choice of only fixed
telephony, and the nest g = 1 represents the choice of fixed telephony and mobile telephony.
We index consumers with subscript i, products with subscript j, and time period with
subscript t. Denote by Ui0t, the utility of the outside option of consumer i at time t. Value
Ui0t may vary over time, e.g., due to its dependence on the prices of fixed telephony. There
are three mobile telephony products, each associated to one of the three firms currently in the
market. The utility derived by consumer i from using fixed telephony together with the mobile
telephony product j in period t is given by:
Uijt = Ui0t + rj − αpjt + Vt + ξjt + ζgt + (1− σ)²ijt, (1)
where rj is the stand alone value of product j, pjt is the price of product j in period t, Vt is the
expected network benefit function in period t, ξjt is the unobserved utility of product j in period
t, ζgt is the common value of all products in nest g in period t, σ on [0, 1) is a parameter that
measures correlation of the consumers’ preferences within the nest fixed telephony and mobile
telephony, and ²ijt is an idiosyncratic taste variable.
By normalizing with respect to the utility of the outside option, Ui0t, the choice between
alternatives becomes independent of the determinants of the utility of fixed telephony. The
consumer’s tastes for products within a nest are correlated. When the consumer’s tastes for
products within a nest are independent, σ = 0, the nested logit model reduces to the logit
model. When σ −→ 1, the alternatives within the nest are perfect substitutes and the post-
merger prices do not change. Variable ξjt is interpreted as the mean value of the consumers’
valuations for unobserved product characteristics, such as product quality, and serves as the
econometric error term.5 Variable ζgt has a distribution dependent on σ, and variable ²ijt has
4A discrete choice model fits well mobile telephony, because consumers usually have one mobile telephone
and the outside option, fixed telephony, is clearly defined. However, nested logit model has the property of
independence of irrelevant alternatives within the nests. This property may be tested following Hausman and
McFadden (1984).
5Prices, stand alone values and unobserved qualities are the only product characteristics in the model.
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an extreme value distribution.
The probability that consumer i subscribes to product j in period t is:
Pijt = Pijt(g = 1)Pijt
(
Uijt ≥ maxk∈{1,....,N},k 6=jUikt
)
, (2)
Denote by Dgt, the value of the nest g in period t, defined by:
Dgt =
∑
j∈Gg
exp
(
δjt
1− σ
)
, (3)
where G is the set of products in nest g, and δjt = rj − αpjt + Vt + ξjt is the mean utility level
of product j in period t. Expression (2) may be written in a closed form as:
Pijt =
exp
(
δjt
1−σ
)
Dgt
D1−σgt
1 +
∑G
g=1 D
1−σ
gt
. (4)
Denote by sjt, the share of product j in period t, i.e., the number of consumers that choose
product j in period t divided by the number of consumers that make subscription decisions in
period t. Probability (2) is equivalent to this share, i.e., sjt = Pijt. The share of mobile telephony
is given by st =
∑N
j=1 sjt. Denote by sjt|g=1, the share of product j of mobile telephony services
in period t, i.e., the number of consumers that choose product j in period t divided by the
number of consumers that choose to consume mobile telephony in period t. The share of the
outside good, i.e., the number of consumers that choose not to subscribe a mobile telephony
product divided by the number of consumers that make subscription decisions in period t is
given by s0t = 1− st = 1−
∑N
j=1 sjt.
Following Berry (1994), we invert the observed market shares to compute the mean utility
levels of each product, and treat them as observed utility levels. Using the observed utility level
and the specification in (1), we arrive to the following equation:
log(sjt)− log(1− st) = rj − αpjt + Vt + σlog(sjt|g=1) + ξjt. (5)
The utility function (1) represents only consumers whose current choice does not depend on
the past, i.e., of consumers that just entered the market, or consumers that where previously in
the market but have negligible or no switching costs.
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There are three types of consumers: (i) consumers that just entered the market, (ii) con-
sumers that where previously in the market but are not locked-in to a product, and (iii) con-
sumers that where previously in the market and are locked-in to a product. The two first types
of consumers choose which product they subscribe. The third type of consumers continue to
use the product that they subscribed previously. We lack data on the number of consumers
that switch of providers over time, and the choices they make. Thus, regarding the third type
of consumers we consider two cases: (i) only consumers with contracts are locked-in, and (ii)
consumers with contracts and 50% of consumers with pre-paid cards are locked-in.6 Since about
80% of the Portuguese consumers use pre-paid cards, in the first case, the majority of consumers
are not locked-in, and may react to price changes. Denote by Zjt, the number of subscribers of
product j in period t, denote by Z ljt, the number of subscribers of product j in period t that
are locked-in, and denoted by yjt, the number of consumers that choose product j in period t.
We approximate the number of consumers that choose product j in period t by the difference
yjt = Zjt − Z ljt−1.
Denote by Mt, the market size in period t, i.e., the number of consumers that can potentially
subscribe to mobile telephony in period t. We assume that Mt = 1.08Pt, where 1.08 is the
penetration rate of mobile telephony in 2005:4, and Pt is the population of Portugal in period t.
Denote by mt, the number of consumers that effectively make subscription decisions in period t.
This value is given by mt = Mt−
∑N
j=1 Z
l
jt−1. The share of product j is then given by sjt =
yjt
mt
.
Denote the by zt = 1Mt
∑N
j=1 Zjt, the penetration rate of mobile telephony in period t.
We assume that due to lags in information transmission, each period consumers only observe
the number of subscribers of the previous period. Thus, the expected network benefits are a
function of the penetration rate of the previous period: Vt = V (zt−1).7 In addition, we assume
that the expected network benefits are a linear function: V (zt−1) = βzt−1.8 Network effects
6Alternatively, one could assume that all consumers of mobile telephony of the previous period are locked-in.
7Of course this begs the question of why consumers do not forecast the contemporary penetration rate. Using
zt in the utility function, which depends on current prices, pjt, would greatly complicate the derivation of the
first-order conditions. In addition, values zt and zt−1 are highly correlated.
8Consumers also derive network benefits from a fixed line network. Given the linearity of the expected network
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are an important aspect of mobile telephony. Ignoring them could lead to overestimating the
price elasticities of demand. By making network effects depend on the penetration rate, i.e., the
total number of subscribers, we are assuming perfect compatibility between the various mobile
telephony products, and the lack of price mediated network effects, due to difference on-net and
off-net prices.
Using demand equation (5), the substitution matrix for the nested logit model is given by:
St =

∂s1t
∂p1t
∂s2t
∂p1t
∂s3t
∂p1t
∂s1t
∂p2t
∂s2t
∂p2t
∂s3t
∂p2t
∂s1t
∂p3t
∂s2t
∂p3t
∂s3t
∂p3t
 ,
where
∂sjt
∂pkt
=
 −
α
1−σsjt
[
1− σsjt|g=1 − (1− σ)sjt
]
if k = j;
α
1−σsjt
[
σskt|g=1 + (1− σ)skt
]
if k 6= j.
(6)
and
∂s0t
∂pkt
= αskts0t. (7)
The elements of matrix St are calculated using the estimates of σ and α.
Using (6), for the products within the mobile telephony nest, the elasticity of demand of
product j with respect to the price of product k is given by:
E
sjt
pkt =
∂sjt
∂pkt
pkt
sjt
.
Using (7), the elasticity of the market demand for mobile telephony subscription with respect
to the price of product j is given by:
Estpkt =
∂(1− s0t)
∂pkt
pkt
st
= −αskt(1− st)pkt
st
.
The elasticity of the market demand for mobile telephony subscription with respect to the lagged
penetration rate is given by:
Estzt−1 = βzt−1(1− st).
benefits function and the linearity of the utility function (1), any network benefits from fixed telephony are
cancelled out when we normalize with respect to the outside option.
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Following Anderson et al. (1992) and Ivaldi and Verboven (2004), the net consumer surplus
for the nested logit model, CSt, equals:
CSt =
1
α
(
1 +
G∑
g=1
D1−σgt
)
. (8)
3.2 Supply
We index firms with subscript f . Denote the price vector by p, and the demand for product
j by Qj(p). The profit function for firm f is:
Πf =
∑
j∈Φf
[
(pj − cj)Qj(p)
]
where Φf is the set of products owned by firm f , and cj is the marginal cost of firm j. Denoted
by ∆, the 3× 3 ownership matrix, formed according to the rule:
∆fj =
 1 if firm f sells product j;0 otherwise.
We assume that firms choose prices and play a static non-cooperative game, i.e., a Bertrand
game. Additionally, we assume that firms only take into account in the profit maximization
problem consumers that are not locked-in. The Nash equilibrium of the game is given by the
first-order conditions:9
∂Πf
∂pk
= Qk +
J∑
j=1
∆fj
∂Qj
∂pk
(pj − cj) = 0, (9)
Denote by ∆ • St, the Hadamard, or element by element product of matrices ∆ and St. System
(9) can be written in matrix notation as:
Q + (∆ • St) (p− c) = 0. (10)
Initially, there are three mobile telephony firms: Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus. Each firm
owns one of the mobile telephony products. Thus: ∆ =I.
9We assume that a Nash equilibrium exists. See Anderson et al. (1992) for a proof of existence for the nested
logit model with multiproduct firms, assuming symmetry.
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In the course of the analysis, we will assume two alternative forms for the matrix ∆: (i)
one associated with the merger of Tmn and Optimus, and (ii) one associated with joint profit
maximization.
3.3 The Data
We use quarterly data from Portugal for the period 1999:1 to 2005:4, obtained from the
firms. For each firm and period, we have: the number of subscribers, Zjt, the number subscribers
with pre-paid cards, the number of subscribers with contracts, the revenues from voice traffic,
the voice traffic, the operating costs, the cost of materials, the cost of labor, and the number
of employees. We also have the interest rate on ten year treasure bonds. We construct average
prices, pjt, by dividing the total firm revenues from traffic by the total number of minutes of
traffic.
4 Econometric Implementation
4.1 Demand Estimates
We estimate two models.10 In Model I, only consumers with contracts are locked-in.
In Model II, consumers with contracts and 50% of consumers with pre-paid cards are locked-
in. Otherwise the models are identical. In particular, in both models the demand for mobile
telephony subscription is a function of: (i) the average prices, (ii) the lagged penetration rate
of mobile telephony, and (iii) firm specific dummy variables. The price and network coefficients
are common across the three demand functions.
[Table 1]
Table 1 presents the estimation results for Model I. The model is estimated first using
ordinary least squares, OLS. Reported R-squared is about 0.60 for each equation. The Breusch-
10The model was estimated using the SAS procedure PROC MODEL. The merger simulation was conducted
in Matlab.
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Godfrey test rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the White test rejects the null
hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity in all three demand equations. Besides, the estimate of σ is
larger than 1, but not statistically significant. To account for the problems of autocorrelation
and heteroscedasticity of the error term, and the problem of endogeneity of prices and the
within group shares, we estimate the model through the general method of moments, GMM,
using the Newey and West (1987) consistent covariance matrix estimator. We use as instruments
the weighted average across firms of the cost of materials per subscriber, the cost of labor per
employee, and the number of workers per subscriber, as well as the interest rate of ten year
treasure bonds, a time trend, and a dummy variable for the fourth quarter.11
The GMM estimates of all parameters are statistically significant. The estimates of α and
σ decrease considerably. In particular, σ is estimated to be 0.865, but statistically significantly
different from 1. This implies that mobile telephony products are very close substitutes.
Table 1 presents also the estimation results for Model II. The OLS estimates are presented
merely as a reference. The GMM estimates are again all statistically significant. Compared to
Model I, the estimate of α increases, and the estimates of σ and β decrease. The estimate of σ is
0.744. However, it is not statistically different from the value 0.865, the estimate of σ for Model
I. The estimates of α and β are also not statistically significantly different from the estimates of
Model I.
4.2 Price Elasticities of Demand
Table 2 presents the average price elasticities of demand for the GMM estimates. The
second, third, and fourth columns give the own and cross price elasticities of demand for the
mobile telephony products. The last column gives the elasticities of the market demand of
mobile telephony with respect to the prices of the mobile telephony products and the lagged
11For instruments we need variables that are correlated with prices and within group shares, but uncorre-
lated with the unobservable demand shocks. Standard candidates for instruments are input factors (Evans and
Heckman, 1983).
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penetration rate.
[Table 2]
For Model I, the own price elasticities of demand are high and range from −2.61 for Tmn
to −6.32 for Optimus. A 1% increase in the price of Optimus decreases its sales by 6.32% and
increases the sales of Tmn and Vodafone by 1.33% each. The values in the last column of Table
2 are interpreted as follows. A 1% price decrease in the price of Optimus increases the number
of subscribers of mobile telephony by 0.06%. This is the outcome of two opposing effects: a
decrease in the number of subscribers of Optimus, and an increase in the number of subscribers
of Tmn and Vodafone. Similarly for Tmn and Vodafone. If all firms increase simultaneously
their prices by 1%, the number of subscribers of mobile telephony decreases by the sum of these
values, which is 0.341%. The small values of the elasticity of the market demand of mobile
telephony subscriptions with respect to the prices of the mobile telephony products suggests
that mobile and fixed telephony are weak substitutes. If the lagged penetration rate increases
by 1%, the number of subscribers increases by 0.99%.
The estimates of the own and cross price elasticities of demand for the mobile telephony
products are larger for Model I than for Model II. However, the elasticities of the market demand
of mobile telephony subscription with respect to the prices of the mobile telephony products and
the lagged penetration rate are larger for Model II than for Model I.12
5 Merger Analysis
The merger of Tmn and Optimus would result in a market with two mobile telephony
firms: (i) one controlling the two products previously owned by Tmn and Optimus, to which we
shall refer as Tmn−Optimus, and (ii) Vodafone, which would maintain its product. The merger
12The lower the number of locked-in consumers, the larger the share of consumers choosing mobiles, sjt, and
the smaller the share of the outside option, s0t. Thus, using equation (6) we get higher own and cross-price price
elasticities for the mobile telephony products, but lower elasticities of the market demand for mobiles.
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consists of change from matrix ∆ to matrix ∆m, given by:
∆m =

1 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 1
 .
We use the demand estimates in Table 2 to compute the marginal costs given by equation (9),
which are presented in Table 3. Then, given these estimates, and replacing ∆ with ∆m, we solve
system (10) with respect to prices, to estimate the price of each product after the merger. Table
3 presents the estimated prices after the merger for Model I and II under three scenarios: (i)
there are no cost efficiencies, (ii) there is 5% reduction in the costs of Tmn and Optimus, and
(iii) there is 10% reduction in the costs of Tmn and Optimus.
[Table 3]
For Model I, after the merger, the prices of mobile telephony increase on average by 7%.
The largest increase, 13%, occurs for Optimus, and the lowest, 3%, occurs for Vodafone.13 If the
merger generates a 10% reduction in the costs of the merging firms, on average, prices increase
by 6%.14
The estimates of the price elasticities are smaller for Model II than for Model I. Therefore,
the price increases are larger for Model II than for Model I. For Model II, after the merger, the
prices of mobile telephony increase on average by 8%.
[Table 4]
13These simulations ignore adjustments in the consumption levels, i.e., in the number of calls and minutes,
resulting from price changes. However, the price elasticities of the demands for calls and duration are very small.
14One could also consider the case in which after the merger, the less efficient Optimus is able to provide services
with the marginal cost level of Tmn. This case is, however, unlikely, since the merger is hostile and is conducted
by Optimus. Besides, it generates implausible results. The price of Optimus decreases by 10% and the price of
Tmn increases by 40%. The price of Vodafone remain almost unchanged. This occurs because the post-merger
margins are equal for both firms, but the pre-merger margins differ significantly.
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Table 4 reports the impact of the merger on profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare,
with 95% confidence intervals.15 For Model I, on average, after the merger the consumer surplus
decreases by 4%. The profits of all firms increase, and on average profits increase by 26%. Social
welfare decreases by 4%. However, the confidence intervals for changes in profits, consumer
surplus, welfare are large and include both positive and negative values. For Model II, the
decrease in consumer surplus is larger.
[Table 5]
We use the information on the operating costs of the firms to asses the plausibility of the
assumption that firms play a Nash equilibrium. More specifically, we compare the estimated
price-cost margins,
pjt−ĉnjt
pjt
, with the observed price-cost margins, revjt−opcjtrevjt , where revjt is the
revenue and opcjt is the operating cost, respectively, of firm j in period t. Table 5 presents
simple statistics on estimated and observed margins. Unfortunately, there are large differences
between these values. This could be due to the definition of operating costs, which are average
accounting costs, rather than economic marginal costs. In particular, the observed margins of
Optimus are negative. The observed margins of Tmn are much higher than those of Vodafone.
We also estimated the marginal costs under the assumption that firms maximized jointly
their prices. In this case matrix ∆ consists only of ones. The estimates of all the marginal costs
are negative. Recall that the mobile telephony products are very close substitutes, while the
outside product is not a close substitute. We take this as evidence that firms do not collude on
prices.
15The confidence intervals were computed using a standard bootstrapping method. The covariance matrix of
the parameter estimates was used to generate 1000 draws from a joint-normal distribution. For each draw, we
computed the percentage change in post-merger profits, consumer surplus, and welfare, relative to the pre-merger
situation. In this way we got a distribution of potential profit changes.
14
6 Conclusion
In this article we simulated the unilateral effects of a merger in the Portuguese mobile
telephony market. We estimated the price elasticities of demand using a nested logit model and
quarterly data from 1999:1 to 2005:4. The mobile telephony subscription products seem to be
close substitutes. Using the estimates of the price elasticities of demand and the assumption
that firms play a Bertrand game we estimated the marginal costs. We used the estimates of
price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs to simulate the unilateral effects of a merger
between Tmn and Optimus. We found that the merger can lead to substantial price increases
even with cost efficiencies.
In mobile telephony, the complexity of the consumers’ behavior and the firms’ strategies is
very challenging for economic modelling. However, we had only limited aggregate data, which
constrained the sophistication of our analysis. In addition, competition authorities or sectorial
regulators usually have limited resources, such as time and personnel, to collect data and evaluate
the merger effects. This is a compelling argument for using simple methods.
There is scarce evidence of the accuracy of merger simulations, due to the small number of
cases in which simulations were conducted. The merger in mobile telephony in Portugal is a
natural experiment that, in case of acceptance, can be used to assess whether standard analysis
of this type may provide us with accurate predictions about unilateral effects.
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Appendix
Table 1: Demand Estimates
Model I OLS GMM
Estimates std (t) Estimates std (t)
ropt 1.141 2.769 ( 0.41) -1.886 0.304 ( -6.20)
rtmn -0.656 1.564 (-0.42) -2.153 0.123 (-17.43)
rvod 0.984 2.432 ( 0.40) -1.804 0.285 ( -6.32)
α -9.644 4.464 (-2.16) -3.258 1.302 ( -2.50)
σ 1.676 1.081 ( 1.55) 0.864 0.118 ( 7.31)
β 5.645 0.647 ( 8.72) 4.753 0.311 ( 15.27)
mse/R-sq Opt. 0.9249 0.59 1.0496 0.51
mse/R-sq Tmn 1.0511 0.57 1.0800 0.52
mse/R-sq Vod. 0.9363 0.63 1.0863 0.53
N*Obj. 72.8092 7.2117
Model II OLS GMM
Estimates std (t) Estimates std (t)
ropt -0.158 2.395 (-0.07) -2.470 0.186 (-13.25)
rtmn -1.539 1.408 (-1.09) -2.671 0.075 (-35.54)
rvod -0.141 2.157 (-0.07) -2.323 0.214 (-10.83)
α -9.176 4.409 (-2.08) -3.767 1.489 ( -2.53)
σ 1.322 0.970 ( 1.36) 0.743 0.139 ( 5.34)
β 5.515 0.657 ( 8.39) 4.628 0.321 ( 14.40)
mse/R-sq Opt. 0.9604 0.57 1.0453 0.49
mse/R-sq Tmn 1.0249 0.56 1.0807 0.51
mse/R-sq Vod. 1.0103 0.60 1.1062 0.51
N*Obj. 74.8365 8.9926
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Table 2: Demand Elastictites: Price and Lagged Subscribers
Model I Optimus TMN Vodafone Mobiles st
Optimus -6.32 1.33 1.33 -0.063
TMN 2.44 -2.61 2.44 -0.170
Vodafone 2.47 2.47 -5.86 -0.108
Net.Effect 0.985
Model II Optimus TMN Vodafone Mobiles st
Optimus -3.93 0.75 0.75 -0.088
TMN 1.37 -1.71 1.37 -0.234
Vodafone 1.39 1.39 -3.71 -0.144
Net.Effect 1.365
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Table 3: Simulation of Post-Merger Equilibrium Prices
Model I p.pre mc ef.0% markup% p.post price %
Optimus 0.2924 0.2257 0.2283 0.3353 0.1288
Tmn 0.1881 0.1044 0.4450 0.2140 0.1200
Vodafone 0.2939 0.2137 0.2729 0.3056 0.0349
mean 0.2380 0.2566 0.0713
p.pre mc ef.5% markup% p.post price %
Optimus 0.2935 0.2144 0.2695 0.3291 0.0985
Tmn 0.1896 0.0992 0.4769 0.2139 0.1042
Vodafone 0.2948 0.2137 0.2753 0.3045 0.0261
mean 0.2389 0.2565 0.0641
p.pre mc ef.10% markup% p.post price %
Optimus 0.2923 0.2031 0.3052 0.3195 0.0721
Tmn 0.1888 0.0940 0.5022 0.2103 0.0946
Vodafone 0.2943 0.2137 0.2740 0.3019 0.0196
mean 0.2378 0.2531 0.0565
Model II p.pre mc ef.0% markup% p.post price %
Optimus 0.3131 0.2257 0.2794 0.3686 0.1684
Tmn 0.2164 0.1044 0.5174 0.2474 0.1378
Vodafone 0.3178 0.2137 0.3277 0.3317 0.0416
mean 0.2307 0.2490 0.0772
p.pre mc ef.5% markup% p.post price %
Optimus 0.3144 0.2144 0.3182 0.3622 0.1448
Tmn 0.2177 0.0992 0.5444 0.2470 0.1310
Vodafone 0.3192 0.2137 0.3306 0.3316 0.0371
mean 0.2314 0.2489 0.0736
p.pre mc ef.10% markup% p.post price %
Optimus 0.3115 0.2031 0.3480 0.3493 0.1137
Tmn 0.2139 0.0940 0.5606 0.2402 0.1186
Vodafone 0.3158 0.2137 0.3233 0.3260 0.0304
mean 0.2299 0.2455 0.0664
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Table 4: Simulation of Post-Merger Equilibrium Profits, Consumer Surplus and Welfare
Model I Mod.II
pre ∆x 1− α = 0.95 % pre ∆x 1− α = 0.95 %
Optimus 0.0148 0.0014 [ 0.0000, 0.0051] 9,5% 0.0166 0.0013 [ 0.0002, 0.0033] 7,8%
Tmn 0.0303 0.0072 [-0.0000, 0.0254] 23,8% 0.0379 0.0079 [-0.0000, 0.0161] 20,8%
Vodafone 0.0272 0.0105 [ 0.0000, 0.0345] 38,6% 0.0312 0.0113 [ 0.0003, 0.0219] 36,2%
CS 4.5937 -0.2009 [-0.4994,-0.0000] -4,4% 2.0070 -0.1289 [-0.1983,-0.0038] -6,4%
Welfare 4.6661 -0.1819 [-0.4431,-0.0000] -3,9% 2.0927 -0.1084 [-0.1652,-0.0031] -5,2%
Optimus 0.0149 0.0039 [ 0.0007, 0.0093] 26,2% 0.0170 0.0033 [ 0.0023, 0.0067] 19,4%
Tmn 0.0309 0.0077 [-0.0001, 0.0283] 24,9% 0.0384 0.0085 [-0.0000, 0.0153] 22,1%
Vodafone 0.0273 0.0085 [-0.0069, 0.0359] 31,1% 0.0317 0.0102 [-0.0004, 0.0201] 32,2%
CS 4.4662 -0.1566 [-0.5112, 0.1425] -3,5% 1.9921 -0.1170 [-0.1849, 0.0080] -5,9%
Welfare 4.5392 -0.1364 [-0.4438, 0.1394] -3,0% 2.0792 -0.0949 [-0.1462, 0.0122] -4,6%
Optimus 0.0143 0.0068 [ 0.0035, 0.0179] 47,6% 0.0165 0.0058 [ 0.0040, 0.0147] 35,2%
Tmn 0.0306 0.0078 [-0.0003, 0.0276] 25,5% 0.0371 0.0087 [-0.0001, 0.0150] 23,5%
Vodafone 0.0273 0.0067 [-0.0095, 0.0311] 24,5% 0.0308 0.0084 [-0.0021, 0.0168] 27,3%
CS 4.3214 -0.1187 [-0.4569, 0.2056] -2,7% 2.0642 -0.0986 [-0.1626, 0.0384] -4,8%
Welfare 4.3937 -0.0973 [-0.3979, 0.2016] -2,2% 2.1487 -0.0757 [-0.1267, 0.0473] -3,5%
Table 5: Observed and Estimated Price-Cost Margins
mean std min max
obsopt -0.137 0.160 -0.71426 0.08068
obstmn 0.223 0.068 0.03140 0.34624
obsvod 0.071 0.076 -0.16373 0.15950
estopt 0.160 0.022 0.13518 0.24609
esttmn 0.390 0.053 0.30918 0.46351
estvod 0.173 0.023 0.14230 0.23966
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